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Abstract
France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands have taken
concrete steps to design and develop international commer-
cial courts. Most of the projects claim to be building courts
that match the preferences of court users. They also try to
challenge England and Wales, which evidence suggests is
the most attractive jurisdiction in the EU. For the success of
these projects, it is important that their proposed courts cor-
responds with the expectations of the parties, but also man-
ages to attract some of the litigants that go to London. This
article argues that lawyers are the most important group of
choice makers, and that their preferences are not sufficiently
matched by the new courts. Lawyers have certain litigation
service and court perception preferences. And while the
new courts improve their litigation service, they do not suffi-
ciently addressed these court perception preferences.
Keywords: choice of court, commercial court, lawyers’ pref-
erences, survey on lawyers, international court
1 Problem Definition and
Background
France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands have
taken concrete steps to design and develop international
commercial courts. Most of the projects claim to be
building courts that match the preferences of court
users (hereafter the new courts).1 They also try to chal-
lenge England and Wales, which evidence suggests is
* Postdoc, Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam. This
project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC)
under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-
gramme (grant agreement No 726032). Information on the ERC consol-
idator project ‘Building EU Civil Justice: challenges of procedural innova-
tions – bridging access to justice’ is available at http://
www.euciviljustice.eu/.
1. From the website of the Netherlands Commercial Court: ‘[…] to create
a baseline that judges, lawyers and parties can easily refer to’ (See the
website of the NNC: https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC (last vis-
ited 8 February 2019), or the International Chamber of the Paris Court
of Appeal […] il est unanimement estimé que pour se rapprocher des
standards internationaux, il serait indispensable que nos juridictions
répondent, mieux qu’elles ne le font actuellement, aux impératifs de
délais exigés pour la resolution des affaires aux enjeux financiers
importants.’ (Haut comité juridique de la place financière de Paris, ‘Pre-
conisations sur la mise en place à Paris de chambres specialisees pour
le traitement du contentieux international des affaires’, (2017), HCJP,
Paris).
the most attractive jurisdiction in the EU.2 For the suc-
cess of these projects, it is important that their proposed
offer not only correspond with the expectations pro-
spective users, but also manage to attract some of the lit-
igants that go to London. This article argues that law-
yers are the most important group of choice makers and
that their preferences are not sufficiently matched by
the new courts. Lawyers have certain litigation service
and court perception preferences. And while the new
courts are an improvement compared with the existing
courts, they do not sufficiently address lawyers’ prefer-
ences, in particular those related to court perception.
This article proceeds as follows. The first section identi-
fies the dominant position lawyers have in relation to
their clients and reports findings from a survey I organ-
ised on lawyers’ choice-of-court preferences. The sec-
ond section provides an overview of not only the new
courts in the EU, but also the general characteristics of
the jurisdiction where they operate. The third section
compares the offer of the new courts – within the frame-
work of their jurisdiction – with the demand of their
potential court users. It highlights the discrepancy
between the preferences of lawyers and the offer of
courts. The fourth section concludes this article and
offers some recommendations for improvement to court
designers and policy makers.
2 Lawyers’ Choice-of-Court
Preferences
This section shows why lawyers dominate their clients
and what their most preferred element in making a
choice of court is in relation to international commercial
cases. The first part of this section identifies lawyers,
and not their clients, as the real force when it comes to
making a choice of court. The second part reports some
of the findings from a survey I organised on lawyers’
choice-of-court preferences in Europe.3
2. S. Vogenauer, ‘Regulatory Competition Through Choice of Contract
Law and Choice of Forum in Europe: Theory and Evidence’, European
Review of Private Law 13, at 53-60 (2013); E. Lein, R. McCorquodale,
L. McNamara, H. Kupelyants & J. del Rio, ‘Factors Influencing Interna-
tional Litigants’ Decisions to Bring Commercial Claims to the London
Based Courts’ (2015), Ministry of Justice, London.
3. This survey was conducted during my PhD studies. Results of this study
were published in: E. Themeli, Civil Justice System Competition in the
European Union (2018), at 266-304.
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2.1 Lawyers as Choice-of-Court Makers
Cross-border litigation requires mobility. This means
that parties should have financial resources for, knowl-
edge of and, the legal possibility for litigating abroad;4 in
addition, they need to overcome certain psychological
hurdles. So while there is a broad autonomy to choose a
court in the EU5 and financial difficulties to litigate
abroad can be solved, lack of legal knowledge and psy-
chological hurdles are difficult to overcome. Psychologi-
cal hurdles include diffidence of foreign jurisdictions,
choice habits, choice overload, and lack of informat-
ion.6, 7, 8, 9 To overcome these psychological hurdles, lit-
igants hire lawyers.10 Lawyers are highly specialised
4. In the European Union, parties can make a choice of court agreement,
which are regulated by Art. 25 of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation
(Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters OJ L 351,
12 December 2012, page 1-32). According to it, parties have considera-
ble freedom to choose any of the courts in the EU despite their domicile
or connecting factors with the chosen jurisdiction. Despite some restric-
tions – for example, the exclusive jurisdiction conferred to some courts
by Art. 24 – Art. 25 gives European courts a global reach; it allows even
parties with no connection to the EU to litigate in the courts of its
Member States. In matters relating to insurance, consumer contracts,
and individual contracts of employment choice of court agreement is
regulated by Arts. 15, 19, and 23, respectively. These articles aim at
providing vulnerable parties an opportunity to reach a choice of court
agreement, while offering protection against the abuses of stronger
parties. In this view Art. 25 is the most important for the new interna-
tional commercial courts. For more on Art. 25 see: U. Magnus, ‘Intro-
duction to Articles 25-26’, in U. Magnus and P. Mankowski (eds.),
European Commentaries on Private International Law: Brussels Ibis
Regulation (2016) 583, at 583-669; F. Garcimartin, ‘Choice-of-Court
Agreements’, in A. Dickinson and E. Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regula-
tion Recast (2015) 277, at 277-306.
5. X.E. Kramer, E. Themeli, ‘The Party Autonomy Paradigm: European and
Global Developments on Choice of Forum’, in V. Lazić and S. Stuij
(eds.), The Brussels Ibis Regulation: Changes and Challenges of the
Renewed Procedural Scheme (2017) 27, at 38-40.
6. Choice habits are important because once established, it is hard to
change them. Certain game theories explain that if for some reason a
choice option attracts the more attention, that is, is the most chosen,
most players develop their strategies assuming that all the others will
choose that option. At that point the expectation becomes self-fulfilling,
and the option that has a starting edge draws even more attention
towards itself. See also: T. Ginsburg, R.H. McAdams, ‘Adjudicating in
Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution’, 45
William and Mary Law Review 1229, at 1264-1266, and 1256 (2004).
Some choice habits take the form of default contractual terms, and at
that point become ‘sticky’. See for more: D. Snyder, ‘Private Lawmak-
ing’, 64 Ohio State Law Journal 371, at 417 (2003).
7. Choice overload affects lawyers as well. However, when it comes to
making a legal choice, lawyers’ choice overload limit may be higher
than that of their clients. On the psychology of legal choice making see:
G. Low, ‘A Psychology of Choice of Laws’, 24 European Business Law
Review 363 (2013); G. Cuniberti, ‘The International Market for Con-
tracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws’, 34 Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 455 (2014).
8. For a psychological perspective see: R. Salecl, ‘Society of Choice’, 20 A
Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 157 (2009); B. Schwartz, ‘The Tyr-
anny of Choice’, 290 Scientific American 70 (2004); B. Schwartz,
A. Ward, J. Monterosso, S. Lyubomirsky, K. White & D.R. Lehman,
‘Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice’, 83
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1178 (2002).
9. Lack of information can be considered also a practical hurdle.
10. Here I mean both lawyers hired as external experts, or as internal
employees of legal entities. The presence of a lawyer in the structure of
the legal entity may help to overcome some of these psychological
problems. But considering the complicated source of these problems
professionals, with experience and knowledge of the
law. So, lawyers may be the solution to overcome some
of the psychological hurdles and the legal information
problems mentioned above, but they also increase litiga-
tion costs, making it even more expensive. In cross-bor-
der litigation, one lawyer may not even be enough.
Often clients hire one lawyer for each jurisdiction they
are involved. Therefore, the costs of cross-border litiga-
tion may escalate quickly, making it expensive for many
and prohibitive for more.
It is suggested that lawyers dominate their clients as a
result of six factors. First, legal knowledge is entropic by
nature.11 The more time passes the more complicated
the interpretation of law becomes. This means that even
repeat players see their knowledge become outdated
overtime, and even lawyers are obliged to spend more
and more time on similar cases. As mentioned earlier,
complexity and time are elements that increase the costs
of litigation, which means that entropy plays a role in
the cost of litigation. Second, a lawyer’s service is a cre-
dence good, which is a good produced by an expert, and
of which consumers cannot assess the quality and the
quantity they need.12 This places the producer in a posi-
tion to dictate what and how much a client should buy.
When it comes to legal services, clients can only trust
lawyers on what and how much service they will need.13
Third, lawyers conduct their activities in a superstar
type of market.14 In these markets, a small difference in
quality is reflected in a big difference in earnings. Cli-
ents – unaware of the quality and quantity of lawyer
service they need – consider lawyers’ fee as an indicator
of their quality.15 So large companies and wealthy per-
sons have the tendency to overpay for their legal serv-
ices. Fourth, the initial lawyer–client relationship devel-
ops slowly, but costs increase relatively fast due to the
complexity of law, the credence good character of the
lawyer’s service, and the superstar type of market law-
yers create. These are sunk-costs because they cannot be
recovered once incurred. At the beginning, every lawyer
and the nature of the legal reasoning, these lawyers are not enough to
overcome all of these psychological hurdles.
11. D.M. Engel, ‘Society of Choice’, 2 American Bar Foundation Research
Journal 817, at 820-1 (1977).
12. R. van den Bergh and Y. Montangie, ‘Competition in Professional Serv-
ices Markets: Are Latin Notaries Different?’, 2 Journal of Competition
Law and Economics 189, at 193 (2006); U. Dulleck and R. Kerschba-
mer, ‘On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics
of Credence Goods’, 44 Journal of Economic Literature 5 (2006).
13. It can be questioned at this point whether or not companies with an
internal lawyer or legal department can overcome this situation. The
answer is yes and no: yes, in case the lawyer is knowledgeable enough
and the case is part of this knowledge; no, if the case is complicated
and if the lawyer lacks the necessary knowledge. It should be taken into
account that lawyers tend to specialise in particular fields of law; and
while experts on their field, they may not be able to give an opinion in
others fields. But regardless of the position, the lawyer remains the most
important element in the choice of court process.
14. G.K. Hadfield, ‘The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts
the Justice System’, 98 Michigan Law Review 953, at 972-6 (2000).
15. It helps in this regards the fact that lawyers are highly specialised and
clustered in small speciality groups. See for this J.P. Heinz, E.O. Lau-
mann, R.L. Nelson & E. Michelson, ‘The Changing Character of Law-
yers’ Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995’, 32 Law and Society Review
751, (2006).
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has to study a case before offering a strategy or an
advice, which creates costs. This initial cost cannot be
transferred to another lawyer, and thus it anchors the
client to the very first lawyer in many cases. Fifth, a liti-
gation resembles a sunk-cost auction, which means that
once a client starts investing in a litigation, the costs
escalate so quickly that the only way out of this situation
is by investing more in the hope of winning and recover-
ing the costs. Sixth, the market for lawyers resembles a
monopoly where natural and legal barriers for entering
the market exist.16 These barriers make it (relatively)
difficult to enter the market. Furthermore, natural bar-
riers, such as the possibility to acquire meaningful
professional knowledge, restrict the number of available
lawyers for a certain type of case. For example, any large
law firm that has been dealing with international com-
mercial cases has been collecting knowledge as well.
This knowledge remains with the firm and helps it to
accumulate even more of it. It becomes, therefore, diffi-
cult for other lawyers to enter this specific market with-
out that specific knowledge. Other barriers like educa-
tion requirements, availability of this education, qualifi-
cation costs, bar membership requirements, and so forth
further increase the difficulties to enter the market,
emphasising its resemblance with a monopoly.
The concurrence of these factors puts clients in a disad-
vantageous position. They search for a service often
unsure of the quality and quantity they want, while
costs escalate quickly, and the possibility to withdraw
becomes more expensive. Lawyers benefit from this sit-
uation to dictate litigation plans and choice-of-court
strategies, which makes them the true output source of
the lawyer–client relationship. A relatively small group
of lawyers working for the biggest law firms can be
expected to be the most experienced in dealing with
international commercial cases. Empirical evidence
seems to confirm these findings. Results from the sur-
vey I conducted on lawyers (described hereunder) show
16. L.E. Ribstein, ‘Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing’,
69 Missouri Law Review 299, at 314-5 (2004).
that 45.7 per cent of the respondents discuss the choice
of court with their clients in less than 50 per cent of the
cases. When it comes to choice-making, only 28.1 per
cent of the respondents have experience of clients mak-
ing the choice, and the rest consider that they (lawyers)
make the actual choice. In addition, respondents were
asked to indicate how often clients followed their advice
when making a choice of court (Question 12, chart here-
under), and 91.5 per cent of them responded that clients
followed their advice in 70 per cent or more of the cases.
Evidently, the empirical results at hand support the the-
oretical claim that lawyers dominate their clients and are
the real choice-of-court makers in many situations.
2.2 Lawyers’ Choice-of-Court Preferences in the
EU – Empirical Evidence
2.2.1 Methodology and Approach to the Study
Most of the previous surveys on choice of law or choice
of forum have been conducted on business representa-
tives or companies, with few having lawyers as respond-
ents.17, 18 The above analysis, however, shows that the
real choice makers are lawyers, and in particular lawyers
working in large law firms. Considering this, I conduc-
ted a survey on this type of lawyers for their choice-of-
17. L.G. Moser Meira, ‘Parties’ Preferences in International Sales Contracts:
An Empirical Analysis of the Choice of Law’, 20 Uniform Law Review
19 (2015); T. Eisenberg and G. Miller, ‘The Flight to New York: An
Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Pub-
licly-Held Companies’ Contracts’, 30 Cardozo Law Review 1475
(2008-2009); G. Cunibertit, ‘The Laws of Asian International Business
Transactions’, 25 Washington International Law Journal 35 (2016);
G. Cunibertit, ‘The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attrac-
tive Contract Laws’, 34 Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business 455 (2014); S. Vogenauer, ‘Regulatory Competition through
Choice of Contract Law and Choice of Forum in Europe: Theory and
Evidence’, European Review of Private Law 13 (2013); S. Sanga,
‘Choice of Law: An Empirical Analysis’, 11 Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies 894 (2014).
18. Among the surveys organised on lawyers: P. Durand-Barthez, ‘The
“Governing Law” Clause: Legal and Economic Consequences of the
Choice of Law in International Contracts’, International Business Law
Journal 505 (2012).
Figure 1
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court preferences.19 I selected the top law firms on the
basis of their revenues in the EU. For this I used two
lists, namely, one from The American Lawyer,20 which
lists the top one hundred law firms in the world in terms
of revenue, and the other is the list of the top one hun-
dred law firms in Europe (excluding British and Ameri-
can law firms) as drawn by the Lawyer.21 I could not
distinguish between lawyers knowledgeable or experi-
enced enough and those with insufficient or little
knowledge in the choice-of-court issues because law-
yers’ biographies were not always available and not
always detailed enough. I decided to distribute the sur-
vey to all the lawyers working in these law firms, invit-
ing only those who have experience in choice-of-court
matters to respond. From the websites of these law
firms, I collected the individual email addresses of all
their lawyers working in the EU, to which I sent an
email inviting them to take part in the survey. I received
529 responses, of which 330 completed, while the rest
had different degrees of incompleteness. The survey
was conducted between October and November 2015.
2.2.2 Demographics
Results from the survey show that the majority of the
respondents were partners (40.6 per cent) or senior
associates (27 per cent) in their firms.22 In addition, 70.6
per cent of the respondents had more than six years of
experience in their job, where 57.27 per cent of them
had more than eleven years of experience. These results
19. As mentioned, the survey was conducted in the ambit of a previous
study. See n. 3.
20. The American Lawyer, October 2014.
21. The Lawyer, periodically, publishes the European 100 Report, which is
an analysis of the market for lawyers in the EU and focusing only on the
continental law firms. For this survey, I used data from the 2014 Report.
See for the updated version: https://www.thelawyer.com/reports/
european-100-2018-report/ (last visited 8 February 2019).
22. Compared to Junior Associates with 7.3 per cent, and Associates with
16.7 per cent.
indicate that most of the respondents held senior posi-
tions and had considerable experience in their job.
Their senior position is significant because they are
often team leaders who control and design the strategies
of larger groups of lawyers; furthermore, they are
among the most experienced in their firms when it
comes to choice-making. For the majority of the
respondents (65.1 per cent), choice of court was also a
frequent activity. When asked where they conducted
most of their professional activity, 28.48 per cent of the
respondents answered Germany, followed by the Neth-
erlands (13.94 per cent), and England and Wales
(8.48 per cent). Despite their seat, the vast majority of
the respondents reported a full professional proficiency
in English (76.7 per cent). This is interesting for three
reasons. First, it is a further evidence that English is the
lingua franca of international trade and business. Sec-
ond, it further justifies why the new courts offer pro-
ceedings in English. Third, it is a hint that the legisla-
tion and the administrative bodies surrounding an inter-
national commercial court should be available in English
so as to further facilitate the ability of foreign lawyers to
familiarise with a jurisdiction. Respondents were also
asked to mention the courts with which they have had a
professional experience. Most of them reported experi-
ences with the English, French and German courts.
Using the data from this question, it can be calculated
that lawyers have experience with an average of 3.23
courts, which can be reduced to 2.23 if their home juris-
diction is removed. In other words, it can be expected
that a professional lawyer knows from a first-hand expe-
rience only two courts. While this is not per se negative,
it shows that lawyers tend to have only a limited practi-
cal knowledge of foreign courts.
2.2.3 Choice-of-Court Preferences
The central part of the survey asked respondents to
mention the most attractive court in the EU (Question
Figure 2
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14). To eliminate any home bias, I removed from the
answers the respondents’ home jurisdiction. After this
operation, England and Wales (42.6 per cent), Germany
(22.3 per cent), and the Netherlands (5.4 per cent) were
the most preferred jurisdictions.23 The most attractive
elements of these courts (Question 15) were ‘quality of
judges and courts’ (22.3 per cent), ‘predictability of the
outcome’ (11 per cent) and ‘the familiarity [of the
respondent] with the jurisdiction’ (9.3 per cent). Most
of the factors can be categorised as either having to do
with the intrinsic quality of the judicial system (‘quality
of judges and courts’, ‘predictability of the outcome’,
etc.) or having to do with how it is perceived (‘familiari-
ty with the jurisdiction’, ‘a common practice of choosing
that court’, etc.).
Frequently, choice of court is made together with the
choice of law. Parties match the law and the court of a
23. These results are comparable with the results of the Vogenauer (see
n. 17) and the Lein surveys (see n. 2), thought the target population is
different.
jurisdiction in order to reduce complexity. It becomes
more complex if a foreign law is interpreted by a foreign
judge. Considering this, I asked respondents which was
more important during the choice of court, substantive
law or procedural law (Question 13). Results do not pro-
vide a clear answer, but preferences lean on the substan-
tive law side, which may indicate that choice of court
follows the choice of law. In addition, I asked respond-
ents to reflect on the differences between common law
and civil law and in which of them it was easier to liti-
gate. These questions are important considering that it
is often mentioned that an advantage of London is the
use of common law compared with the civil law of conti-
nental Europe. Respondents agree (Question 21) that
the differences between common law and civil law are
considerable, but they disagree that it is easier to litigate
in a common law country compared with a civil law
country (Question 22). These results seem to indicate
that the difference between civil and common law is not
that important in making a choice of court.
Figure 3
Figure 4
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2.2.4 Analysis
On the basis of the results of the survey, it can be said
that lawyers have two groups of preferences: one is liti-
gation service related, and the other is court perception
related. Results from the survey hint that court percep-
tion preferences are very important, and perhaps more
important than litigation service preferences.24 For
example, according to the civil justice part of the Rule of
Law Index (RLI), England (as the United Kingdom) is
fourteenth in the world and eighth in Europe.25 Also an
analysis of the EU Justice Scoreboard shows that the
United Kingdom’s civil judicial system ranks seventh in
the EU.26 In view of these results, England appears to
have a qualitative judicial system, but certainly not the
best in the EU. One can rebut that England has the best
(international) commercial courts in Europe; however,
24. For this, consider also the surveys of Durnad-Barthez, and Vogenauer.
Above n. 17 and 18.
25. In the EU, England ranks seventh after Netherlands, Denmark, Germa-
ny, Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Estonia. RLI data can be accessed at
http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#table (last visited 8 February
2019).
26. See n. 3, at 245.
there is no evidence for this. So, while England does not
have the best judicial system, it seems that lawyers’ per-
ception about its courts is of a relatively high level. In
fact for respondents, ‘familiarity with the jurisdiction’,
‘client’s familiarity with the jurisdiction’, and ‘a com-
mon practice of choosing that court’ are some of the
most attractive elements that indeed have little to do
with the intrinsic qualities of the system and more with
how it is perceived.27 Indeed, evidence seems to support
this claim. Results from Question 6 of the survey show
that most of the respondents reported professional expe-
riences in England. This number is almost double com-
pared with that of the second-placed Germany, which
speaks of the familiarity that lawyers (and perhaps their
clients) have with England. According to the results
from Question 20, the majority of the respondents
(69.9 per cent) considered England to actively trying to
attract litigants in its court system, the Netherlands and
Germany are second and third with 23.9 per cent and
23.1 per cent of the responses, respectively. Further-
27. Already, the research of Lein was suggesting this for a different group
of respondents. See Lein n. 2.
Figure 5
Figure 6
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more, the Law Society of England and Wales continual-
ly promotes London’s courts in international events.
In sum, lawyers consider two groups of preferences
when making a choice of court: one is the litigation serv-
ice preferences, and the other is court perception prefer-
ences. The case of England, which is the most attractive
jurisdiction in the EU, shows that court perception
preferences are very important. In fact, considering that
the quality of English courts is not better than many
others in Europe, perception seems to be essential to its
success. For the new courts, therefore, it is important
not only to be highly qualitative, but also to be per-
ceived positively. If the system where they are embed-
ded does not have a sufficiently positive perception, the
new courts should try to improve this. If they do not
improve this court perception, their success is at risk.
3 Strategies of the New
International Commercial
Courts
The previous section demonstrated that in some situa-
tions lawyers may dominate their clients, and when it
comes to the choice of court chances are high that they
will be the one to take the decision. On the basis of the
results of the survey, lawyers seem to have two types of
preferences when it comes to cross-border courts: one
includes those related to the litigation service of the
court, while the other one includes court perception
preferences. To be successful, the new courts’ offer
should match these preferences. The new courts, how-
ever, can respond only to some of the preferences of
lawyers, for example, ‘quality of judges and courts’,
‘predictability of the outcome’ or ‘speed of the dispute
resolution’. Other preferences, such as ‘familiarity of the
jurisdiction’, ‘enforcement possibilities in that jurisdic-
tion’ or ‘a common practice of choosing that court’, can
be related only to the quality and reputation of the juris-
diction where the new court is established. To assess
whether or not the new courts will match the preferen-
ces of their potential users, it becomes important to con-
sider not only their offer but also the health of the judi-
cial system where they operate. This section takes on
this task. It provides an overview of the judicial system
where each new court operates, focusing on the particu-
lar elements that fulfil the preferences of parties when
making a choice of court; in addition, it makes on over-
view of how the offer of the new courts matches the
preferences of their potential users. To assess the offer
of each judicial system, I use data from the EU Judicial
Scoreboard (Scoreboard) and the Rule of Law Index
(RLI) with a particular attention on the elements con-
sidered important by potential court users. I highlight,
therefore, how attractive the new courts would look for
prospective court users. Despite being part of the bigger
competitive picture, I omit England from this analysis
because it does not offer a new court, but, instead, pro-
motes its already existing judicial system.
The EU Judicial Scoreboard is a collection of data rela-
ted to the civil justice system of each EU Member State.
In the words of the Commissioner for Justice Věra Jour-
ová ‘… it helps Member States to address the challenges
they are facing with their justice system’.28 Despite the
name there is no ranking of the best or worst jurisdic-
tion. This has never been the aim of the Scoreboard.
Data collected by each Member State are organised and
reported into categories, with figures being the smallest
unit that report data. In each figure, Member States are
ranked on the basis of their performance. Every figure
provides relative29 data about the health of each Mem-
ber State; I use the ranking in some of the figures to
consider the general offer that the new courts provide.
The Rule of Law Index is a study organised by the
World Justice Project, a not-for-profit organisation
based in the United States. As the name suggests, the
RLI collects data on several factors that influence the
rule of law in each of the jurisdictions it studies. One of
the factors considered is civil justice, for which seven
sub-factors are considered.30 Data from the civil justice
factor of the RLI are used hereunder to consider the
general outlook of the new courts’ judicial system.
Some criticism about these instruments exits. Both the
Scoreboard and the RLI remain quantitative studies
with little qualitative insight. Furthermore, the data
they provide come with little context, which can be mis-
leading. Despite the lacunae, both the Scoreboard and
the RLI are unique in their task, and provide a compila-
tion of data helpful in quantitative longitudinal and in-
depth studies. The analysis, hereunder, refers only to
some of the figures of the Scoreboard, in particular,
Figure 5 (‘Number of incoming civil and commercial
litigious cases’), Figure 8 (‘Time needed to resolve liti-
gious civil and commercial cases’), Figure 16 (‘Number
of pending litigious civil and commercial cases’) and
Figure 59 (‘Businesses’ perception of judicial independ-
ence’).
The next section reports data from the Scoreboard and
the RLI for each of the new courts’ jurisdictions. It
makes an inventory of the offer of the new courts
together with the judicial system where they are embed-
ded. In Section 3, the results of this inventory will be
compared with the lawyers’ preferences to understand
how much the offer of the new court matches them.
28. Foreword to the 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard.
29. Relative because it is difficult to find a reference frame in which to
assess the importance of the data. In absence of any reference frame,
data from different Member States can be compared with each other to
consider the relative health of each Member State in relation with the
others.
30. These sub-factors are ‘Accessibility and affordability’, ‘No
discrimination’, ‘No corruption’, ‘No improper government influence’,
‘No unreasonable delay’, ‘Effective enforcement’, and ‘Impartial and
effective ADRs’.
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3.1 Belgium – Brussels International Business
Court
Belgium scores eighteenth in the world for the civil jus-
tice factor of the RLI, with high results on all the sub-
factors but the ‘no unreasonable delay’. Compared with
the other Member States considered in this study, Bel-
gium scores better than France, but lower than the
Netherlands and Germany. Compared with the EU and
EFTA31 and North America, Belgium ranks eleventh
out of twenty-four jurisdictions. Compared with devel-
oped countries, Belgium is rather average with no clear
excellence.
Data from the Scoreboard (Figure 5) show that Belgian
courts receive a relatively high number of civil and com-
mercial litigious cases. Only Romania has higher figures.
It is obvious to think that the high number of cases may
play a role in the ability of the Belgian courts to resolve
them. Surprisingly enough, Belgian courts are the fast-
est in the EU in resolving litigious civil and commercial
cases (Figure 8). While this is true for the first instance
courts, data from third instance court show that these
are amongst the slowest (seventh place from the bottom,
Figure 9). It can be argued that part of the large number
of cases that are resolved by the first instance courts
reach the higher courts, which do not have the capacity
to process this volume and thus create delays and case
backlog. As a result, the number of pending cases in
Belgium is somehow average compared with other EU
Member States (Figure 16), and while better than
France, it is not as good as the Netherlands or Germa-
ny. As regards independence, businesses consider Bel-
gian courts to be more independent than those of Ger-
many or France. Belgium ranks ninth in this figure
compared with the second-ranked Netherlands, and the
third-placed United Kingdom.
Belgium is the last actor to enter the competition to
attract international commercial cases and the race to
create a special court for this. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, Belgium plans to create the Brussels Interna-
tional Business Court (BIBC). The prominent charac-
teristics of the BIBC will be as follows: (a) court pro-
ceedings will be held in English; (b) the court will be
composed of a judge supported by two lay judges selec-
ted among experts in the field of dispute, and lay judges
may also be non-Belgian nationals; (c) proceedings will
be conducted according to the UNCITRAL Model Law
on international commercial arbitration; (d) the possibil-
ity of appeal will be limited only to cassation; and
(e) court fees will be relatively high.32
The draft law suggests that the BIBC is trying to avoid
any association with the current court system in Bel-
gium.33 It does this in offering a new procedure that is,
UNCITRAL Model Law, a special composition of the
judging panel, and the absence of appeal. These may
31. European Free Trade Association includes Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway,
and Switzerland.
32. The bill can be accessed at the official page of the Belgian parliament:
http://www.dekamer.be/doc/flwb/pdf/54/3072/54k3072011.pdf (last
visited 8 February 2019).
33. This is also accepted in the bill. In particular see page 10-11.
address three issues related to the Belgian courts. The
first one is the relative slow pace at which commercial
cases are resolved in Belgium’s higher courts. Reducing
the possibility to appeal provides parties with a final
decision, but more importantly it gives the impression
that court proceedings are fast and to the point. The
second issue is the quality of judges. The BIBC will
have in its offices selected judges, probably among the
best in Belgium. These judges will be supported, case
by case, by lay judges with considerable experience in
the field.34 The final issue is the relative obscurity of the
Belgian courts. Data from the survey, analysed in Sec-
tion 1, show that few lawyers are familiar with the Bel-
gian courts. These data in conjunction with the data on
lawyers’ preferences when choosing a court, suggest that
any new court aspiring to attract cross-border commer-
cial cases should create a fan base. And this fan base can
be created more easily by providing them with a set of
rules that is relatively ‘famous’, in this case the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law. However, this is only one facet of
the same object, which includes familiarity with the
court, common knowledge that the court is good, and a
common practice of choosing that court, which do not
seem to be addressed by the BIBC project.
3.2 Germany – Chambers for International
Commercial Disputes
In the civil justice factor of the RLI, Germany ranks
third in the world, and in the EU, EFTA, and North
America subgroup, with above-average high scores in
each sub-factor. In particular, the German civil justice
scores high in the ‘No corruption’, ‘No improper gov-
ernment influence’, and ‘Effective enforcement’ sub-
factors. Only the Netherlands and Denmark score better
than Germany in the RLI ranking. Data from the
Scoreboard show that Germany has relatively few
incoming civil and commercial litigious cases (Figure 5).
This number is higher compared with the Netherlands,
but lower compared with Belgium and France. German
courts are on the median line for the time needed to
resolve civil and commercial cases, when it comes to
both first instance (Figure 8), and higher instance (Fig-
ure 9). The speed of the German courts is reflected in
the low number of pending cases (Figure 16), which is
higher than the Netherlands, but lower than Belgium
and France. Businesses’ perception of judicial inde-
pendence in Germany has been constantly falling from
2010 to 2017 (Figure 59). It is not clear why this is hap-
pening, but it may require some attention from the gov-
ernment.
Data from both the RLI and the Scoreboard may be
interpreted to show that German courts are better than
those of France and Belgium, but not better than those
of the Netherlands. Germany seems to score relatively
high on the time needed to resolve a dispute, although
34. Selecting the best judges to sit in the courts and supporting them with
lay judges with a high reputation in field may be very productive
according to Coyle. This is often mentioned as a success factor for arbi-
tration. J.F. Coyle, ‘Business Courts and Interstate Competition’, 53
William and Mary Law Review 1915, at 1972-1973 (2012).
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the fall of the “independence perception” needs to be
addressed. Fast courts give the impression of an effi-
cient court, which is also what the brochure ‘Law Made
in Germany’ claims.35 It should be added, though, that
the fact that cases are resolved relatively fast in German
courts does not mean that they are efficient; other fac-
tors may be important here.36
Germany’s attempt to create a special setting for inter-
national commercial disputes is rather complicated.
Some attempts to create special English-speaking sec-
tions in certain courts have failed.37 The failure may be
attributed to Article 184 of the Courts Organisation Act,
which requires the use of German during court pro-
ceedings.38 To overcome this, the proponents of the
chambers for international commercial disputes have
put forward amending the Courts Organisation Act with
the intention to allow parties to use English in these spe-
cial chambers.39 Other parts of the proposal focus on
time management, and a streamlined and predictable
process. Apart from this proposal, which attempts regu-
lation on a national level, on regional level the ‘Frank-
furt Justice Initiative’ seems to be the most advanced.
This Initiative was started by a group of academics and
lawyers with the support of the Minister of Justice of
the Federal State of Hessen.40 The aim of the Initiative
was to capitalise from the possible litigation migration
from post Brexit London, the position of Frankfurt as
an international financial hub, and the good reputation
of the German courts. An achievement of the Initiative
was the creation of the Chamber for International Com-
mercial Disputes at the Lower State Court in Frankfurt
(Landgericht Frankfurt am Main), which in its own
words ‘was established to create an attractive forum for
cross-border disputes of English-speaking parties allow-
ing them to benefit from Germany’s reliable and expe-
ditious public dispute resolution mechanisms and highly
efficient enforcement mechanisms’.41
Germany’s court system health seems to be better than
most of the other Member States in Europe. Consider-
35. Law Made in Germany is a brochure prepared and published by a con-
sortium of German institutions, which promote the German legal cul-
ture including law and courts. It is also served by a dedicated website:
https://www.lawmadeingermany.de/ (last visited 8 February 2019).
36. For instance better resources, better trained lawyers, more human
resources in courts, etc.
37. In 2010, the courts of Cologne, Bonn, and Aachen created a project to
use English as the language of oral proceedings in case parties would
ask for it. The attempt was not very successful because apart from the
oral part, the rest of the process was in German. https://www.lto.de/
recht/hintergruende/h/modellprojekt-in-nrw-lg-koeln-goes-
international/ (last visited 8 February 2019).
38. “Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 9.
Mai 1975 (BGBl. I S. 1077), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes
vom 12. Juli 2018 (BGBl. I S. 1151) geändert worden ist”.
39. Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung von Kam-
mern für Internationale Handelssachen (KfiHG), Drucksache 19/1717 of
18 April 2018, Begründung, at 8-10 available at http://
dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/017/1901717.pdf (last visited 8 Feb-
ruary 2019).
40. http://conflictoflaws.net/2017/the-justice-initiative-frankfurt-am-
main-2017-law-made-in-frankfurt/ (last visited 8 February 2019).
41. https://ordentliche-gerichtsbarkeit.hessen.de/ordentliche-gerichte/lgb-
frankfurt-am-main/lg-frankfurt-am-main/chamber-international (last
visited 8 February 2019).
ing the data from the survey analysed in Section 1, Ger-
many is the jurisdiction where lawyers have more expe-
rience after England and Wales, while its courts report
fast proceeding times. These are some of the most
important ingredients for creating an attractive jurisdic-
tion for international commercial courts. In addition,
Germany has a strong export-oriented economy, with a
potential for cross-border litigation. What Germany
lacks, in my opinion, is more aggressive promotion of its
system and a different approach to establishing interna-
tional commercial courts. Perhaps, it would be better to
establish a single commercial court at federal level
instead of courts at state level, though this may be more
challenging from the legislative point of view. A positive
aspect of this idea is that such a court would accumulate
experience and a fan base faster than a multitude of
small courts. Furthermore, it would concentrate the
most talented judges in a single place, providing a more
attractive venue, while reducing competition between
the different federal states.42 As it was the case with Bel-
gium, Germany lacks a clear strategy to promote its new
courts. It may be too soon to think about this consider-
ing that the proposal is still under scrutiny in the Parlia-
ment, but strategies that target lawyers’ court percep-
tion are of considerable importance as the above analysis
showed.
3.3 France – International Chamber for
Commercial Disputes
Based on the results of the RLI, France’s civil justice is
twenty-second in the global ranking, and thirteenth in
the EU, EFTA, and North America group. France
ranks better than Belgium, but worse than the Nether-
lands, Germany, and the United Kingdom. France
seems to have a low score in the ‘No discrimination’
subgroup, while the score in the other subgroups is
high. Relative to the other Member States, French
courts receive an average number of civil and commer-
cial litigious cases, which is lower than that of Germany
and the Netherlands, but higher than that of Belgium.
However, French courts seem to be relatively slow,
being almost at the bottom of the table, for the time
needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases
(Figure 8). This situation does not improve even if the
first, second, and third instance are considered (Fig-
ure 9). In both these figures, France is the last from the
jurisdictions studied in this article. The slow processing
time reflects also in the number of pending cases (Fig-
ure 16), which is the sixth highest in the EU. France,
however, has a similar score with that of Germany when
it comes to businesses’ perception of judicial independ-
ence, but compared with Germany the perception is
improving and not deteriorating.
In February 2018, the Court of Appeal of Paris inaugu-
rated a special chamber for international commercial
disputes.43 This special chamber will serve as second
42. Judges concentration is similar to what was already mentioned in n. 30
above.
43. The protocol that establishes this chamber: https://www.cours-
appel.justice.fr/sites/default/files/2018-06/CICAP_English_Protocole
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instance to the already existing International and Euro-
pean Chamber of the Paris Commercial Court.44 The
main features of these chambers are the use of English
in documentary evidence (procedural acts will be
drafted in French) and during hearings, which will have
a bigger place in the process – inspired by the common
law tradition. Court decisions will be issued in French,
accompanied by a sworn translation in English. Said
features have been agreed between the courts of first
instance and appeal, and the bar association of Paris.
From a positive perspective, French courts and lawyers,
with this agreement and the blessing of the Ministry of
Justice, have avoided the legislative path that goes
through the parliament.45 From a negative perspective,
this solution may be pragmatic, but legal certainty may
be affected here. Considering that the use of English
before the courts is based on a memorandum of under-
standing between the courts and the bar of Paris, parties
may contest the use of English during court proceedings
as a violation of French law and Constitution.46
France is one of the strongest economies in the EU, and
also the centre of many international organisations and
companies. The prospect of Brexit in conjunction with
the need to offer a premium service to international
commercial litigants resulted in a renovation of the
existing international commercial chambers. Supposed-
ly, Brexit provides a financial opportunity to attract liti-
gants migrating from the London courts, while financial
opportunity provides a reason for creating new stream-
lined court procedures. In fact, if the new procedures
agreed between the Parisian courts and the bar associa-
tion can improve the performance of the French courts,
the later ones can become very attractive to international
commercial litigants. On the positive side, France is the
second jurisdictions with which lawyers have the most
experience after the first-placed England and Wales.47
This fact plays an important role considering that
‘familiarity with the court’ and ‘a common practice of
going to that court’ are two of the elements that influ-
ence choice of court for lawyers. Another positive factor
of the French courts is their early start, which may have
created a fan base or ‘a common practice of going to that
court’, which may be detrimental to fend off the new
emerging courts from Belgium, Germany or the Neth-
erlands.
%20barreau%20de%20Paris%20-%20Cour%20d’appel%20de
%20Paris_mai2018.pdf (last visited 8 February 2019).
44. The protocol: https://www.cours-appel.justice.fr/sites/default/files/
2018-06/CICAP_EnglishVersion_Protocole%20barreau%20de%20Paris
%20-%20Tribunal%20de%20commerce%20de%20Paris.pdf (last vis-
ited 8 February 2019).
45. See the article from Biard in the same issue of this journal. A. Biard,
‘International Commercial Courts in France: Innovations Without Revo-
lution?’, Erasmus Law Review (2019).
46. E. Jeuland, ‘The International Division of the Paris Commercial Court’, 4
Tijdschrift voor Civiele Rechtspleging 143, at 144 (2016).
47. Question 6 from the Survey.
3.4 The Netherlands – The Netherlands
Commercial Court
The Netherlands has the best civil justice system in the
world according to the RLI, with a very high score on
all the subgroups, in particular in ‘no corruption’ and
‘no improper government influence’ subgroups. Data
from the Scoreboard show that the Netherlands receives
a relatively low number of civil and commercial cases,
which is almost seven times less than Belgium and
almost two times less than Germany (Figure 5). This
low number of incoming cases may play a role in the
short amount of time needed to resolve them. Figure 8
shows that Dutch courts are relatively fast when the
first instance is considered, surpassed only by Belgium,
Latvia, and Luxembourg. The same can be said for the
number of pending litigious civil and commercial cases,
which is the fourth lowest in the EU (Figure 16). Fur-
thermore, the Netherlands is the second Member State
with the highest perception of judicial independence by
companies (Figure 59). Considering the RLI and the
Scoreboard, it is clear that the Netherlands scores not
only better than Belgium, Germany, and France, but
also better than the United Kingdom.
Having this in mind, the First Chamber of the Dutch
parliament approved the law for the establishment of
the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC) on
11 December 2018.48 The NCC opened its doors on 1
January 2019 as a special chamber of the District Court
of Amsterdam, which is specialised in resolving interna-
tional commercial disputes in English. Parties should
specifically agree to go to this court for resolving their
disputes. Court fees are higher compared with the nor-
mal court to justify the special organisation and special
procedural rules created for this court. The aim of these
rules is to improve efficiency, and to offer case manage-
ment in a case-by-case approach.49 One positive aspect
of the NCC proposal is that it requires some marketing
plans.50 If perhaps these marketing plans would suggest
also activities that tackle the court perception of lawyers,
it may pave the road to success for the NCC.
Considering the high score of the Netherlands, it seems
difficult to find an area of improvement for the Dutch
courts. However, the Dutch should not rest on laurels
and should consider also that the success of the NCC
depends also on how it is perceived. Attracting cross-
border litigants requires considerable effort, which the
NCC’s promoters seem to acknowledge. But more effort
will be needed to establish a common practice of choos-
ing this court. Two factors may be essential here, one is
48. G. Antonopoulou, E. Themeli and X.E. Kramer, ‘No fake news: the
Netherlands Commercial Court proposal approved!’, http://
conflictoflaws.net/2018/no-fake-news-the-netherlands-commercial-
court-proposal-approved/ (last visited 8 February 2019).
49. See also the bill on the NCC ‘Reglement voor de internationale handels-
kamers van de rechtbank Amsterdam (NCC District Court) en het ge-
rechtshof Amsterdam (NCC Court of Appeal)’ available at: https://
www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/concept-ncc-reglement-
juni-2018.pdf (last visited 8 February 2019).
50. See the article from Bauw in the same issue of this journal. E. Bauw,
‘Commercial Litigation in Europe: In Transformation: The Case of the
Netherlands Commercial Court’, Erasmus Law Review (2019).
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Brexit and the possible migration of litigation from Eng-
land to other EU jurisdictions, and the second is the fact
that the Netherlands is one of the most preferred juris-
dictions for registering a company. The hope here is
that companies registered in the Netherlands may bring
cases to the NCC, and perhaps Brexit and the proximity
of the Netherlands with England may also play a posi-
tive role in this respect.
4 Conclusions: Matching
Preferences and Courts
This article argues that the new courts in Belgium, Ger-
many, France, and the Netherlands do not seem to
properly address users’ court perceptions. Section 1
showed that large and medium companies, assisted by
their lawyers, are the most probable users of the interna-
tional commercial courts. Lawyers and not clients are
responsible for the choice of court as a result of the serv-
ice type they provide, the qualities of the market for
lawyers, and some other factors created as a combination
of these two. In fact lawyers dominate their clients. This
conclusion was confirmed by the findings of my survey,
where lawyers responded that clients follow their sug-
gestion or leave it to them to make the choice-of-court
decision. Results from the aforementioned survey show
that England and Wales is the most preferred jurisdic-
tion for international commercial litigation for lawyers.
For them the quality of judges, lack of corruption, and
neutrality are the most important factors when choosing
a court. In addition, factors such as familiarity with the
court, client’s familiarity, a common practice of choos-
ing that court, and a common knowledge that the court
is qualitative play an important role. Lawyers’ preferen-
ces can be grouped in two: one is the group of preferen-
ces related to the litigation service, and the other is the
group of preferences related to the perception of the
court.
Some preferences have to do with the characteristics of
the jurisdiction where the new court is located rather
than new court itself. Section 2 suggested that the new
courts – as international commercial litigation venues –
together with the jurisdiction where they operate should
match lawyers’ preferences if they want to be successful.
This article argues that the new courts do not match the
preferences of lawyers, and in particular court percep-
tion preferences. To argue this, I made an inventory of
the offer of the new courts and their jurisdictions in the
second section. Data from the RLI and the Scoreboard
were used to assess the quality of these jurisdictions.
According to the RLI, the Netherlands has the best
judicial system in the world, followed by Germany, Bel-
gium, and France. France suffers in all the analysed fig-
ures of the Scoreboard, while the Netherlands is often
among the top five EU jurisdictions. I have left England
outside of this analysis because even though being a
competitor it does not create any new court. In addition,
I briefly described the design of the new courts, point-
ing out their respective strong points, in particular those
that would make them attractive to lawyers. The results
of this analysis are summarised in Table 1.
Summarising the analysis, Table 1 shows that the civil
system of some jurisdictions already match certain pref-
erences of international commercial lawyers (marked
with ‘e’). For example, the RLI shows that the Nether-
lands has already a good quality of judges and courts.
This does not mean that Belgium and France have low-
quality judges and courts, but they are not of the same
level. Yet another example, results from the survey sug-
gest that there is a stronger common practice of going to
Germany and France to litigate international commer-
cial disputes, compared with Belgium and the Nether-
lands, but way weaker compared with England. Next to
the already existing attributes of the judicial systems in
Table 1 New courts and preferred court elements
BE DE FR NL
Quality of judges and courts n e n e n
Predictability of the outcome n n n n
Familiarity with the jurisdiction e e
Client’s familiarity with the jurisdiction e e e
Speed of the dispute resolution e n e n e n
A common practice of choosing that court e e
Common knowledge that the court is good n
Enforcement possibilities in that jurisdiction e e
Fairness of the outcome e n n e n
e = existing measures, n = measures of the new court
Preferences related to lawyers’ court perception are marked in italics.
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Table 1, I have added which one of the preferences are
addressed by the new courts (marked with ‘n’). Evident-
ly the new courts address important issues such as speed
of dispute resolution, predictability of the outcome, and
fairness of the outcome. For example, the BIBC aims at
a streamlined process, which should be able to resolve a
dispute very fast. Or the fact that the new courts aim at
a new structure with ‘handpicked judges’ shows that
they want to increase the quality of judges and courts.
What is missing in these projects is a plan to address the
group of preferences related to lawyers’ court percep-
tion (marked in italics). While the promoters of these
new courts may be aware (e.g. the Netherlands) of the
need to ‘convince’ lawyers to use these courts, it is hard
to see any strategy or attempt to promote them. Most
emblematic is that all the activities of the ‘Frankfurt
Justice Initiate’ have been held in German in Germany,
while the court is intended to be international and in
English. It can be argued that these activities aimed at
convincing the local legal community of the need of
such a court; however, the international community
deserves attention as well. As opposed to this approach,
England actively promotes its jurisdiction on a global
level and mostly to lawyers. Perhaps the promotion of
its courts, combined with a tradition to go to London to
litigate, and a qualitative judicial system is the key of the
English success. Perhaps the outlook is as important as
the substance – a lesson that the new courts should learn
fast if they want to succeed.
In sum, the new courts and their supporting jurisdic-
tions seem to offer what the international commercial
litigants want. However, they do not seem to do much
about court perception–related elements. It remains to
be seen if this will change in the future; otherwise, the
new courts increase the chances of not succeeding in
this race.
5 Final Remarks
This article shows that some jurisdictions in the EU are
at different stages of creating international commercial
courts, with the aim of attracting cross-border litigants.
While the new courts are an improvement compared
with the local courts, they should do more to change the
perception of lawyers about them. In this final section, I
want to address the issue of Brexit and conclude this
article with two recommendations.
As it was mentioned, the new courts consider Brexit as
an opportunity to carve out for themselves a piece from
the English pie. Brexit therefore serves two functions. It
is not only a catalyst for making haste to create the new
courts, but also a new opportunity of profit for them. So
while, Brexit is not the reason for building the windmill
of the new courts, it certainly is the wind that moves
their sails. What is going to happen remains rather spec-
ulative, but according to a Thompson Reuters report,
English lawyers think that their workload will decrease
after Brexit, while European lawyers think that their
workload will increase.51 Some respondents from the
same survey suggest that, after Brexit, cases may
migrate from London’s court to arbitration. However,
arbitration lawyers remain sceptic about this idea. A
survey, organised by White & Chase and Queen Mary
University of London, found that lawyers think that
London will survive as the main seat where to conduct
arbitration in Europe, but no increase in the workload
can be expected.52 Interestingly, this survey finds that
lawyers prefer London firstly for its reputation and sec-
ondly for being neutral and impartial. As suggested by
the results of this survey, but also by the analysis in this
article, reputation, perception, and image play an
important role in choosing a forum. It is therefore advis-
able for the new courts to consider the following sugges-
tions.
First, competing jurisdictions should not only try to
promote their courts as if they were a product, by high-
lighting the benefits and the gains compared with other
competitors, but also change the perception lawyers and
their clients have of their jurisdiction. Second, the new
courts should try to make local lawyers their clients habit-
uels so that habit and common knowledge is created in a
community, which can later be exported abroad. If the
new courts would also pay attention to these points,
they will have more chances to beat England at their
own game.
51. Thompson Reuters®, ‘Catalyst or Catastrophe? How Brexit Will Impact
Law Firms’, (2018), Thompson Reuters®, London.
52. White&Chase® and Queen Mary University London, ‘2018 Interna-
tional Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration’,
(2018), White&Chase® and Queen Mary University London, London.
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